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Yes. Section 106 of the San Franeisco 
came effective 8, 1932 , reads: 
works shall have and succeed to the 
powers and duties of the Board of Public Works from and 
after twelve o'clock noon on the 8th of 1932." 
Article VI, chapter I, section 9, subdivision 1 of San Fran-
cisco's Charter of 1900 (Stats. pp. 286-287) read: 
''The Board of Public vV orks shall have charge, super-
intendence and control, under such ordinances as may from 
time to time be adopted 
"1. Of all public ways, avenues, places, 
courts, and boulevards now or which 
may hereafter be in the ; of the 
manner of their use; and of all work done upon ... the 
same; and herein the board shall have exclusive 
authority to 
*Plaintiff does not question the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain 
the trial court's findings of fact. 
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Section 335 of the San Frmwisco Pnblic Code reads 
: "It shall be nnlawfnl for any person ... to 
any excavation in ... the surface of any 
... 'IVithont first from the of 
\Vorks a written ('rrtifirate that 
rntitleil to make such rxeavation .... " 
In of the of 
established rule JS 
r:able that one is not entitled to relief until the pre-
did not exhaust his administrative remedies he was not en-
titled to relief. 
8 econcl: ·was denied because 
did not come into court with "clean hands"? 
Yes. [2] 'fhe rule is settled in California that 
a party as actor, seeks to set 
tion and obtain some remedy, has violated 
faith or other equitable principle in his prior conduct, then 
the doors of the court will be shut against J1 im in : 
the court will refuse to interfere on his behalf to ackno-wledge 
his right, or to afford him any remedy. (DeGarmo v. 
man, 19 Cal.2d 755 at 764 [5] et seq. P.2d 1]; Bowman 
v. Bowman, 125 CaL~pp. 602 at 612 [13 P.2d 1049, 14 
P.2d .) 
[3] The foregoing rule is applicable to the facts presented 
in the instant case. The record discloses that plaintiff, with-
out written permit and in violation of the San Francisco 
Public vVorks Code, graded Argent Alley so as to make it 
available for vehicular traffic when it had been previously 
used solely for pedestrian traffic. By grading a roadway into 
the alley without a permit, plaintiff circumvented the city's 
permit procedure established for the protection of the public. 
Upon either the granting or denial of a permit, the procedure 
provided for an appeal to the board of permit 
the applicant if the permit was denied; or, if granted, by any 
person who deemed his interests or property would be ad-
versely affected as the result of operations under the permit. 
By ignoring the city's permit procedure and building the 
road without a permit, then suing defendant, the Director of 
Pub lie \YorkR, for a mandatory injunetion, plaintiff attempts 
to nullify the procedure established by law, denies the public 
the hearing to which it is entitled, and flouts the public in-
terest ·which the procedure was designed to protect. Ob-
viously the public, whom defendant represents, was injured 
by plaintiff's illegal eonduet and the "clean hands" doc-
trine applies to him. 
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the northwest corner of Market Strret and Alley. 
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the concrete stairs as called for by the plans, to 
"bnild this ramp up here so that lYe eonld use it for our 
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established by the supervisors, the engineering de-
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stairfl were called for, to shift the stairs 10 feet sonth. 
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side>Y::tlk to accommodate the ramp and a veJ1ide 
the ramp from han~ing up on the edge of the side-
milk The continuous curb was not bnt a 
was inserted between the enrb aml the street 
a vehicle eonld cross the cnrb. 
It is eon tended that this unlawful eonstrnetion for Zion';;; 
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Hence has no access, pedestrian 
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appears. The rear of his lot abuts on 
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It runs parallel to 23d Street. Argent is 
pa''"nuLv for vehicles from Market Street to the rear 
From there on to Corbett Street there are 
for use pedestrians. Plaintiff, finding Argent filled 
with debris, obtained permission of defendant, head of the 
department of public works, to clean it up and had a bull-
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Relief is not denied because the plaintiff may have acted 
n,.".,..,"'"'" in the past or because such prior misconduct 
affect the problem before the court. A party 
have relief in connection with a transaction itself nnt<>lnh,,l 
his title may have been tainted 
These principles are well settled. 
107 532 
165 Cal. [131 P. 
Union Tel. Co. v. Commercial Pac. C. Co., 177 Cal. 577 
P. Equity ,Jurisprudence ed.), p. 
§ 399; cases collected 30 C.,J.S. p. § 98 ; 4 A.L.R. 44 
at p. 65.)'" also Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
Poe. Cable 177 Cal. 577 [171 P. 317]; Watson v. Poore, 
18 CaL2d 302 [115 P.2d 478] ; Hamrick v. Hamrick, 119 Cal. 
App.2d 839 [260 P.2d 188]; Boericlce v. Weise, 68 Cal.App. 
2d 407 [156 P.2d 7811; -JYlcCarthy v. City of Oakland, 60 Cal. 
App.2d 546 [141 P.2d 4]; Miller & L1.iX v. Enterprise etc. 
Co., 142 Cal. 208 [75 P. 770, 100 Am.St.Rep. 115] ; Genna 
1t!fg. Co. v. ·JJicClellan, 107 Cal.App. 532 [290 P. 534] ; Bradley 
Co. v. Bradley, 165 Cal. 237, 242 [131 P. 750]; City of Los 
Angeles v. Watterson, 8 Cal.App.2d 331 [48 P.2d 87].) 
Here the only unlawful act charged against plaintiff is that 
he graded Argent without obtaining a permit, but that does 
not mean that he cannot complain of the closing of Argent. 
They are unrelated transactions. If the conclusion of the 
majority is correct, any time a citizen commits some minor 
infraction with reference to public streets, he may be forever 
barred from objecting to the dosing of a street because he 
has unclean hands. The closing was not the result of the 
grading of the street. It was an arbitrary action on defend-
ant's part because he thought it was unsafe to permit vehicular 
traffic on Argent. 
The majority lumps together plaintiff's grading of Argent 
with his alleged failure to exhaust an administrative remedy 
as showing laek of clean hands. Certainly failure to exhaust 
is not a showing of unclean hands and as will later appear 
herein, plaintiff had no administrative remedy. 
On the question of exhaustion of remedies, the majority 
refers to plaintiff's failure to appeal to the board of permit 
appeals after his application for a permit to pave Argent was 
denied. No application was made for anything else and the 
paving would have no effect on the closing of Argent. Even 
if he had obtained a permit to pave, defendant would still 
have closed Argent. Hence there was no administrative 
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ti<:nlar ad n a district, direct application to the 
r·onrts fo1· rrlief has been permitted and the ordinance held 
nnconstitutional. Apparently in these cases there was no 
for a variance in the ordinance. The question 
whether an administrative should have been rxhansted 
not or dis<·nssed. It seems clear, however, that it 
110t clone bceanse there was no administrative remedy to 
pnr:mr." ( Rernstc£n v. 83 Cal.App.2d 108. 115 [188 
. ) Here the ehartcr and ordinantcs of San Fran-
eiseo do not purport to give anyone the right to confer special 
to m:e Argent, and the paving of it, as c;een, hac; no 
r,•lation to the of it. There is no law which the 
dirrr:tor of public works, any power to dose a 
reet or to issue permits for the cnstomary and usnal use 
·wllieh streets arc put such as vehicnlar and pedestrian 
traffic; his power is limited to pe1·mits to use streets for pnr-
othrr than the eustomary onrs. rfhe chartrr proYisions 
set forth in the majority opinion only the director 
and control over the streets and expressly 
that permits for using them may be granted for any 
purpose "other thnn such as orilinar£ly and belonus 
the " 'l'hrre ean be no (]Urstion that nse of streets 
fot· Yehic·ular traffi(' helongfl to the publi<' and h<>n<'e the <1i-
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In re J. David 
X o. 5912. In Bank 
on Behalf of LYNN GRITTON 
Habeas Corpus. 
Licenses-Power to License or Tax-License Tax for Revenue. 
The of the state is opposed to the raising of 
revenue collection of direct taxes as a condition precedent 
to the conduct of business. 
Id.-Power to License or Tax-Power of Noncharter Counties. 
-A noncharter county may require a legitimate business to 
obtain a license if the eounty's purpose is to regulate or raise 
funds to be used in regulating the business. 
!d.-Construction of License Laws.-Where a eounty ordinance 
amended the ordinance that the regu-
of the were not to apply 
movement of buildings onto property not subject to 
county building code, and also provided that permits to 
move buildings onto such premises "shall be issued upon appli-
cation and payment of the required fee," on payment of such 
fee a permit could not be denied. 
!d.-Construction and Effect of License Laws.-Where the 
board of supervisors affirmatively declared in an amended 
ordinance that regulatory provisions of the original ordinance 
were not to apply to movement of buildings into noncoded 
in the the court cannot reapply the regulatory 
of the ordinance which the board explicitly ex-
and a permit for movement of buildings into noncoded 
cannot be denied on payment of the required fee; 
hence an attempted enforcement of the amended ordinance 
See Cal.Jur., Licenses, § 26; Am.Jur., Licenses, § 7 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Licenses, § 7; [2] Licenses, § 3; [3, 4] 
Licenses, § 16. 
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